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█ Abstract How do people make decisions? Previous psychological research consistently shed light on the fact 
that decisions are not the result of a pure rational reasoning, and that emotions can assume a crucial role. This 
is particularly true in the case of moral decision-making, which requires a complex integration of affective and 
cognitive processes. One question that is still open to debate concern the individual factors that can affect mor-
al decisions. Gender has been consistently identified as a possible variable of interest for the adoption of differ-
ent strategic behaviors, with men using more rational processes and women more deontological principles. In 
the present study we aimed at exploring the presence of gender differences in different decision-making scenar-
ios. Results showed that the moral scenario led to a similar acceptance rate in both genders, while economic and 
shopping offers were more likely to be accepted by men. Also, women were more inclined to refuse unfair of-
fers, which included a higher personal benefit at the expense of the opponent, even if this meant a total loss for 
both parties. Finally, correlational analyses revealed a different relation between risk propensity and decision-
making in men and women in different scenarios. 
KEYWORDS: Decision-making; Utilitarianism; Altruism; Moral Decision-making; Economic Decision-making 
 
█ Riassunto Decisioni morali, economiche e d’acquisto a confronto. Effetti di genere e utilitarismo – Come pren-
diamo le decisioni? La letteratura psicologica disponibile ha chiarito in ampia misura come le decisioni non sia-
no il risultato di un ragionamento puramente razionale e che le emozioni possono assumere un ruolo cruciale. 
Questo è particolarmente vero nel caso delle decisioni morali, che richiedono una complessa integrazione tra 
processi affettivi e cognitivi. Una questione ancora aperta riguarda i fattori individuali che possono incidere 
sulle decisioni morali. Il genere è stato identificato come una possibile variabile da considerare rispetto 
all’adozione di comportamenti strategici differenti, in cui gli uomini sembrano più inclini a far uso di processi 
razionali e le donne a considerare principi deontologici. In questo lavoro abbiamo provato a esplorare la pre-
senza di differenze di genere in diversi contesti decisionali. I risultati hanno mostrano come in ambito morale 
entrambi i generi siano portati ad accettare opzioni simili, mentre offerte economiche e commerciali sono ac-
cettate in misura maggiore dagli uomini. Le donne sarebbero più inclini a rifiutare offerte inique che compren-
dono benefici personali maggiori a discapito di una controparte, anche se questo implica una perdita totale da 
ambo le parti. Infine, le analisi correlazionali hanno mostrato una diversa relazione tra propensione al rischio e 
processi decisionali tra uomini e donne in contesti diversi. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Processi decisionali; Utilitarismo; Altruismo; Processi decisionali morali; Processi decisionali 
economici 
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How do people make decisions? How 
do they sift through the information 
without drowning into a sea of alter-
natives and which are the factors that 
lead them into a certain direction?1 
 
 
THE THEORY OF DECISIONS OWES its devel-
opment to the members of different disci-
plines such as philosophers, mathematicians, 
psychologists, sociologist, economists, etc. 
Each of those disciplines has emphasized a 
special aspect of decision-making. As well-
known, decision theories are usually catego-
rized into descriptive2 and normative3 ones. 
The formers are based on empirical observa-
tions and on experimental studies about 
choice behaviors, whereas the latter assumes 
that humans should behave as rational deci-
sion-makers, who follow well-defined prefer-
ences according to certain axioms.4 
The process underlying rational choices 
requires that the subject would be able to de-
termine a set of actions, to identify a rela-
tionship that links actions to their conse-
quences, to order all possible consequences 
and to choose the best action. Nevertheless, 
decisions cannot be considered only as the 
result of a pure rational reasoning. In fact, 
emotions assume a crucial role in this process 
and some decisions cannot be separated from 
their emotional component. 
This is what happens in moral decisions 
and that is the reason why the study of moral 
choices represents a powerful tool to investi-
gate the relationship between decision-
making and emotions. 
 
█  Moral decision-making 
 
Moral judgments have a crucial role in so-
cial behavior. People constantly assess their 
own and other's behavior and try to adjust 
their actions into what is considered to be 
“morally right”. Indeed, moral decision-
making could be described as the complex 
integration of affective and cognitive pro-
cesses.5 It includes decisions that are general-
ly accepted and norms of behavior that are 
culturally shaped.6 Furthermore, those deci-
sions with possible harmful effects over 
someone else have also socially negative out-
comes that could even lead to legal conse-
quences. 
Over the years, philosophers have been 
thinking about the origins of morality and 
about which are the determinant factors of 
morality, whereas psychologists have mostly 
focused on the inspection of the mental pro-
cesses underlying the complexity of moral 
behavior. In particular, neuroscientific re-
search has mainly investigated the presence 
of specific neural networks devoted to moral 
reasoning. In fact, thanks to the development 
of neurocognitive sciences, the interrogative 
about how we make moral choices has ex-
panded to the study of which neurobiological 
correlates and which brain mechanisms un-
derlie moral behavior.7 
For example, though the study of neuro-
transmitters and hormones specifically in-
volved in moral decision-making have not 
found solid evidence yet, it has been proven 
that oxytocin influences cognitive and emo-
tional processes which are relevant for moral 
judgment, and this fact may also explain the 
partial heritability of moral patterns.8 Indeed, 
it is rather reasonable to hypothesize that ge-
netic variations on oxytocin pathway con-
tribute to individual differences in moral 
judgments.9 
Other important non-invasive in-vivo 
studies on humans about the morphological 
and functional brain architecture have been 
conducted.10 For example, it has been discov-
ered that dopamine affects several aspects of 
social behavior that are essential for moral 
choices such as motivation, reward, reinforc-
ing learning, altruism, and empathy.11 For ex-
ample, a study by Pellegrini and colleagues,12 
explored the relationship between genotype 
and the attitudes toward moral dilemmas. By 
genotyping five genetic variants of the do-
paminergic pathway in 200 participants, they 
found a significant gender effect over moral 
acceptability. 
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In detail, results revealed that those geno-
type combinations improving dopaminergic 
signalling increased moral acceptability in 
women, in a way to make their responses more 
similar to those given by men. The authors in-
terpreted this result by hypothesizing that an 
increase in dopamine availability could rein-
force the cognitive strategies at the expense of 
the emotional processing usually adopted by 
women during decision-making, thus favoring 
a more rationally-driven decision process. 
For what concerns risk-taking in economic 
decision-making, several studies have shown 
that the dopaminergic projection from the 
ventral tegmental area to the ventral striatum 
is particularly important in reward processing 
showing the relevance of the dopaminergic 
pathway in this frame.13 However, contrasting 
results are reported in the literature about the 
role of dopamine receptors genotypes in eco-
nomic decision-making.14 For example, Dreber 
and colleagues found that a genetic variation 
of a dopaminergic receptor was associated 
with higher risk-taking propensity only in the 
men sample.15  
A few brain-imaging studies have investi-
gated the neural brain activity in subjects, 
who were asked to make moral choices refer-
ring to various scenarios16 focusing on the re-
lationship between emotional processing and 
moral judgments.17 For example, Greene and 
colleagues demonstrated that both cognitive 
and emotional neuro-functional mechanisms 
are involved in decision-making processes, 
sometimes even with mutually competitive 
roles.18 In fact, in their experiment, they found 
that solving difficult personal moral dilemmas 
with personal moral violations triggered spe-
cific brain areas typically recruited during ab-
stract reasoning and cognitive control, such as 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 
and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). In 
attempting to explain the role of cognitive and 
emotional mechanisms in moral judgment, 
the authors suggested a dual-process theory. 
They described two different and com-
peting neurological systems: a slow and con-
scious cognitive system and a fast and uncon-
scious affective system.19 The former in-
volves a conscious and rational appraisal of 
facts that produces a utilitarian response. For 
this reason, the system is supposed to be ac-
tive when personal and emotional involve-
ment is reduced. On the other hand, the lat-
ter engages affective responses and is the re-
sult of being emotionally involved in the sit-
uation. In this case, responses tend to be non-
utilitarian. 
 
█  Utilitarian choices and altruism 
 
The term utilitarian judgment indicates a 
deliberative thinking oriented at achieving the 
greatest utility. The decision is taken follow-
ing a calculation that requires to assign values 
to the benefits and harms resulting from an 
action and to compare them with the benefits 
and harms that might result from other ac-
tions. Conversely, non-utilitarian decision-
making involves intuitive and not rational 
thinking. For example, when responding to 
moral dilemmas, participants have to choose 
whether to sacrifice one person in order to 
save the lives of a greater number. 
According to the definition above, and 
following a utilitarian reasoning, one might 
decide that breaking the fundamental moral 
principle “do not deliberately harm some-
one” could be the best option in order to in-
crease the utility for the greatest number of 
people.20 Then, it seems evident that utilitar-
ianism is anyhow connected to altruism since 
it considers the benefits for the whole con-
text and not just within an individual frame. 
However, it is mostly related to the so-called 
effective or “optimal altruism”, a definition 
referring to a rational use of evidence and 
reasoning to define the best way to help oth-
ers.21 Thus, to sum up, we can follow an intu-
itive reasoning leading to traditional altruism 
(or charity), or a rational reasoning. 
This can lead to a utilitarian choice, 
which is moved by external incentives, or to 
an optimal altruistic (or endogenous) deci-
sion, which is moved by internal incentives. 
The effects related to optimal altruism last 
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longer than the effects of utilitarian choices. 
In fact, optimal altruistic behaviors can be sus-
tained indefinitely by the self, while utilitarian 
behaviors can only be sustained by something 
outside the self. The external incentives, such 
as monetary rewards, in fact, decay more rap-
idly than internal incentives. Thus, optimal 
altruism needs internal motivation.22 
When facing a moral dilemma, people 
show to be utilitarian when facing an emo-
tionally non-salient decision, or in the so-
called “impersonal” moral dilemma. Con-
versely, when choice involves, for example, 
inflicting a direct harm to one person in order 
to save other people’s lives (which is exactly 
what is required to do in the so-called “per-
sonal” moral dilemmas), many people decide 
not to do any action or at least to act in a con-
dition of high emotional conflict.23 But what 
impersonal and personal actually mean? 
The prototypical example of an impersonal 
moral dilemma is the trolley dilemma.24 The 
scenario involves a runaway trolley that is going 
to hit five people who will be killed if it pro-
ceeds on its current way. The only possibility to 
save them is to pull a switch that will deviate 
the trolley towards another railway, where it 
will kill only one person, instead of five. In this 
condition, people generally say “Yes, I would 
pull the lever”.25 On the other hand, most peo-
ple say no to the footbridge dilemma.26 The 
scenario is the same as in the previous example, 
but to deviate the trolley the subject is asked 
not to switch the lever, but to push an over-
weight stranger from a footbridge standing the 
tracks, towards the oncoming trolley to stop it 
and save the five people. 
The trolley dilemma, unlike the foot-
bridge dilemma, is defined as “impersonal” 
since it is more “editing” rather than “author-
ing” in first person. From a philosophical 
perspective, a possible explanation of such 
choices from the subjects could be that per-
sonal dilemmas involve a violation of Kant’s 
practical imperative, namely that humans 
must never be used as a mere means for 
someone else’s purpose, but only as a target.  
As said above, personal moral judgments 
are associated with the recruitment of the af-
fective system, whereas impersonal conflicts 
are more related to the cognitive system. In 
order to find scientific basis of this assump-
tion, Greene and colleagues used the fMRI 
technique and found that when dealing with 
personal dilemma a significant activation in-
volving emotional areas emerged, as com-
pared to impersonal scenarios.27 
Several sources of evidence came out in 
literature to support the dual-process hy-
pothesis. Some studies demonstrated that 
participants’ willingness to endorse utilitari-
an actions that require personally harming an 
innocent can be affected by variables that in-
fluence brain functioning.28 For example, the 
role of serotonin appeared to be linked to 
utilitarian outcomes by enhancing the aver-
sive emotional response to causing others’ 
harm.29 Some other studies focused on the 
role of controlled cognition, meant as the ca-
pability of deliberately sizing up about some-
thing. In some of them, imaging results re-
vealed that the behavioral outcomes in terms 
of frequency and reaction times were modu-
lated by specific networks related to con-
trolled cognition for utilitarian choices,30 for 
time pressure and for cognitive load.31 
 
█  Gender differences in decision-making 
 
The psychological groundwork of moral 
psychology lies in Piaget and Kohlberg’s the-
ories. In his theory, Piaget32 assumed that 
moral stages are universal, and their devel-
opment is invariable. Later, in addition to 
these assumptions, Kohlberg33 asserted that 
morality is universal, equal for men and 
women and for all cultures. This idea has 
nevertheless been repeatedly questioned. 
The role of factors such as gender, educa-
tion, and religion opens the more general 
question: “is morality innate or is something 
people learn?”.34 Thus, one of the major fac-
tors considered in evaluating moral reason-
ing and behavior is gender. 
Currently, it is well-known that men and 
women react differently to emotions, with 
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women being more accurate in processing 
and labeling, for example, emotional faces.35 
Similarly, Thayer and Johnson36 found fe-
males as being more accurate in recognizing 
facial expression compared to men. Such dif-
ferences have also been related to neuro-
anatomical differences in brain networks de-
volved to affective processing, considering, 
for example, the wider grey-matter volume in 
specific parts of the limbic system.37 Thus, 
considering the crucial role of the emotional 
involvement in decision-making, it could be 
of great interest to explore also gender differ-
ences. In fact, previous research already 
demonstrated the influence of such emotion-
al “female advantage” over other cognitive 
processes.38 For example, Canli and col-
leagues39 revealed a better memory perfor-
mance for highly emotional events in women 
than men, while Burton and colleagues40 
demonstrated that the affective content had 
a more negative effect on memory in female 
participants, compared to males. 
Previous research investigating gender 
differences in moral reasoning has been lim-
ited primarily to behavioral techniques such 
as coding verbal responses to hypothetical 
moral dilemmas.41 In particular, research on 
moral decision-making is now mainly con-
sidering how exactly gender differences are 
manifested in moral judgment. It is a com-
mon belief that women are more often in-
clined to sentimentalism, to intuition, and to 
emotions than men. This line of research is 
usually traced back to Kohlberg’s six-stage 
theory of moral reasoning and Gilligan’s op-
posing work,42 which criticized Kohlberg’s 
theory as being biased in favor of men. As al-
ready discussed by Capraro and Sippel,43 in 
his theory Kohlberg asserted that the moral 
development, and more precisely the devel-
opment of one’s explanations of one’s moral 
actions, occurs on six stages: every new stage 
that an individual achieves increases his own 
capabilities to respond to moral dilemmas.  
According to Gilligan, Kohlberg stated 
that women frequently get stuck at the third 
level of this development, defined as post-
conventional morality, where individual 
judgment is based on self-chosen principles, 
and moral reasoning is based on individual 
rights and justice. Conversely, men more of-
ten move forward to the abstract principles 
of morality. While men solve moral dilem-
mas involving rational reasoning, respecting 
law and order, women seem to be mostly 
driven by emotions, empathy and care for 
others. This led Gilligan to define two diver-
gent modes of moral reasoning: an ethic of 
care and an ethic of justice. Studies led by 
Aldrich and Kage44 and Björklund45 seem to 
confirm the existence of these differences. 
The first is thought to be more based on uni-
versal principles and rules, while the second 
involves concepts like involvement, relations 
and the role of others. The role of gender has 
thus been discussed in terms of “justice-care” 
dichotomy. 
Moreover, Bussey and Maughan46 showed 
a significant difference in the evaluation of 
gender-specified moral agents by men but 
not by women. On the other hand, Garwood 
and colleagues47 found no gender effects at 
all. The reasons underlying these effects can 
be found by considering a social-evolutionary 
perspective. 
In fact, as suggested by Rand and col-
leagues,48 social roles can be significant in 
this case. Women are expected to adopt more 
collective and altruistic behaviors, while men 
are supposed to be more assertive and inde-
pendent.49 According to these stereotypes, 
previous research found that when women 
behave contrarily to these ideas and are, 
then, perceived as insufficiently kind, gener-
ous, communal, they are liked less in general, 
but they are also less welcomed in the work-
place.50 So, women are more expected to be-
have altruistically.51 In second instance, these 
expectations actually lead women to habitu-
ate to being altruistic and to behave in a less 
utilitarian way.  
More recently, some neuroscientific stud-
ies tried to shed light on gender-related dif-
ferences in neural networks recruited by 
moral decision-making. Since behavior can 
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be considered as the result of all neural activ-
ity, neuroimaging could be used to assess 
whether men and women show differences in 
brain region activation in moral reasoning 
and if utilitarian choices show specific neural 
patterns.52 Indeed, functional neuroimaging 
studies have identified a consistent set of 
brain regions involved in processing different 
types of moral stimuli including moral di-
lemmas, statements, and pictures.53 
More recent studies showed that men 
override intuitive moral options in highly 
emotional and difficult moral dilemmas 
more often than what women do.54 This indi-
cates that men are more willing to deal with 
rather pragmatically moral trade-offs despite 
the risk of harm for others. 
On the other hand, women seem to be 
more empathetic and to care for others at 
risk. Youssef and colleagues55 demonstrated 
that, during stressful situations, females tend 
to make less utilitarian moral decisions than 
males. Scheele and colleagues56 reported be-
havioral data supporting the different impact 
of oxytocin on self-processing in women and 
men. They found out that changing the 
amount of this hormone led male subjects to 
more strongly endorse self-benefit outcomes 
in moral dilemmas, but did not influence de-
cision-making in ones without a self-benefit 
outcome or involving non-moral contexts. By 
contrast, in women, oxytocin led the behav-
ior toward other-regarding preferences, with 
self-benefit dilemmas being less endorsed 
and the reaction time difference between ac-
cepted and rejected self-benefit dilemmas be-
ing increased. 
Interestingly, in a recent meta-analysis, 
Armstrong and colleagues57 discussed the 
gender effects related to the use of deonto-
logical principles, which derive from moral 
rules and utilitarian principles that maximize 
overall outcomes. The results of their analy-
sis revealed that women show higher scores 
for deontological tendencies than men.  
Besides the gender differences related to 
moral decision-making, much of the previous 
evidence about the presence of different 
choice styles has also focused on risk-taking 
behavior in economic scenarios. In particu-
lar, one of the most recurring results is that 
women might be less risk-seeking and more 
risk aversive than men.58 However, it also 
seems that in the attempt to maximize their 
gains, men take more risky decisions, but also 
pay more for the consequences of their 
choices.59 
To explore risk-taking behaviors in un-
certain conditions, previous research imple-
mented specific computerized tasks which 
simulate decision-making. 
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)60 is one 
of the best known in the literature. It is a 
card game in which subjects are presented 
with four decks of cards. Each of them can 
either reward or penalize them in terms of 
game money. The aim of the game is to win 
as much money as possible. However, the 
four decks differ based on the balance of 
gain/loss cards. Thus, there are “bad decks” 
and “good decks”. 
Typically, after about 40 or 50 selections, 
participants are rather good at identifying 
the good ones. Previous research, however, 
revealed that women perform more poorly 
than men61 since they exhibit more loss aver-
sive behavior in the task by avoiding the ad-
vantageous decks, which are accompanied by 
possible big losses. Other perspectives, how-
ever, underlined the importance of focusing 
on the existing differences in information 
processing to frame the distinct decision-
making behaviors.62 In detail, it seems that 
men attend more to global information by 
focusing on a single relevant information, 
while women consider multiple aspects of a 
problem.63 For example, in the IGT, women 
consider the frequency of both rewards and 
penalties of each deck, as well as the overall 
pay-off.64 On the other hand, men decide 
based more on the long-term payoff of each 
deck considered alone.  
Finally, another possible frame where 
gender was considered as a significant varia-
ble for decision-making is shopping.65 For 
example, previous studies highlighted an ef-
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fect of gender over the involvement in 
Christmas shopping.66 
Moreover, gender stereotypes proved to 
be correlated with memory tasks. Specifical-
ly, it has been shown that women are more 
efficient at memorizing grocery than geo-
graphical directions. The same did not apply 
to hardware shopping lists.67 Also, neuroimag-
ing studies highlighted the presence of specific 
neural networks in men and women when 
choosing groceries.68 In summary, at present, 
there is evidence about the presence of signifi-
cantly different decision-making behaviors 
between women and men in different real-life 
contexts. Also, as reported by a recent meta-
analysis,69 it seems that different experimental 
conditions can significantly modify the choice 
behaviors in man and women. 
 
█  The present study: Aims and hypotheses 
   
We developed our experimental hypothe-
ses starting from the consideration that men 
and women may show different attitudes in 
deciding to accept or refuse some offers when 
exposed to scenarios with or without a moral 
subject. Thus, we proposed three adapted ver-
sions of the Ultimatum Game,70 a popular in-
strument used in economic experiments, set in 
economic, moral or shopping scenarios. 
The first aim was to compare the ac-
ceptance rates in these different contexts. Ac-
cording to what discussed so far, and thanks to 
the presence of intrinsic motivations, we ex-
pected a general higher acceptance rate for the 
moral condition. 
The second aim was to compare the 
choice behaviors between unfair and fair of-
fers, for which we hypothesized a higher ac-
ceptance rate according to a maximization of 
utility. Moreover, we were interested in com-
bining these variables with gender differ-
ences. Here, we expected a higher number of 
accepted offers in the economic and shop-
ping scenarios by men since these choices 
could be guided by more extrinsic than in-
trinsic motivations that could lead to a more 
rational reasoning. 
Finally, we were interested in examining 
the correlation between choices and risk-
taking attitudes. In particular, we expected 
the presence of specific differences in the 
combination of personality attitudes, gender, 
and decision-making scenarios. 
 
█  Methods 
 
█  Participants 
 
202 volunteers participated in the exper-
iment. Three of them were excluded due to 
data incompleteness. Thus, the final sample 
included 199 participants, 137 women and 62 
men of comparable age (Mfemales = 22.9; SD = 
6.2; Mmales = 21.9; SD = 2.8). The experiment 
was conducted in accordance with the Decla-
ration of Helsinki and all the procedure were 
carried out with an adequate understanding 
of the subjects. No payment was provided. 
 
█  Procedure 
 
The experiment was inspired by the Ulti-
matum Game (UG) and built up using the 
same structure. Thus, there was a hypothet-
ical bidder who made some different pro-
posals that participants were asked whether 
to accept or not. According to the original 
paradigm, subjects were informed that, in 
case they did not accept, both parts would 
have lost the amount of the payoff. Partici-
pants were first asked to read carefully the 
instructions. 
The questionnaire was composed of dif-
ferent hypothetical situations framed in 3 
scenarios: economic (E), moral (M) and 
shopping (S). In the E situation, the scenario 
described the story of a work colleague ask-
ing for help with an extra-work that could 
lead to extra money. Participants were also 
informed that, after accepting the job, the 
contribution from the two parts was substan-
tially equal. After that, they were required to 
accept or refuse some possible offers from 
the colleague about how to split the earned 
money, which consisted of € 1000. In the M 
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condition, participants were required to im-
agine a situation in which they won a special 
bonus at work in addition to their usual sala-
ry. However, in order to help a colleague in 
times of need, they were proposed by their 
boss to split this bonus with a beneficial asso-
ciation, which supported his son/daughter 
fighting against leukemia. 
Finally, in the S scenario, participants 
were presented with a situation in which they 
could benefit from a voucher offered by a 
colleague and valid only in an affiliated shop 
for the same day. In this case, participants 
were required to accept or refuse some offers 
related to a shirt they wanted. In all cases, 
they were reminded about the fact that if 
they had rejected the offer neither of the two 
parts would have obtained anything. Each 
situation involved 3 other types of offers, 
that were presented in a randomized order 
within each condition. The offers could be 
neutral (N) or unfair. In the case of a neutral 
proposal, the money of the E and M situa-
tions was equally distributed between the 
two parts (50%/50%), while in S the tenden-
cy to use the voucher was encouraged by the 
fact that the shirt was not exactly the one de-
sired, but very close in colour. 
For what concerns, instead, the unfair 
conditions, they could be of two kinds: 
downwards (D) or upwards (U) in relation to 
the bidder. In detail, for E and M conditions, 
the D offer led to a disadvantage for the sub-
jects (20% vs. the 80% for the colleague or 
the association), while the U offer proposed 
the opposite outcome. For the S condition, 
instead, the D offer consisted in using the 
voucher for an imperfect shirt, while the U 
offer allowed using the voucher for a shirt 
that, by mistake, was more expensive than it 
was written on the price tag.  
Thus, the questionnaire was composed by 9 
sections, 3 for economic (E), 3 for moral (M) 
and 3 for shopping (S) situations, with neutral 
(N), downwards (D) or upwards (U) offers. 
The completion required about 20 minutes. 
Participants had to take a choice by crossing 
the proper answer to accept or refuse the offer. 
█  BRET 
 
The Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET) is 
an intuitive task aimed at measuring risk atti-
tudes. Subjects decide how many boxes to col-
lect out of 100, one of which contains a bomb. 
Earnings increase linearly with the number of 
boxes accumulated but are zero if the bomb is 
also collected. The BRET requires minimal 
numeracy skills, avoids truncation of the data, 
allows the precise estimation of both risk 
aversion and risk seeking, and is not affected 
by the degree of loss aversion or by violations 
of the Reduction Axiom.71 
 
█  Results 
 
█  ANOVAs 
 
To explore the tendency to accept or refuse 
offers across the different experimental condi-
tions, the number of “accepted” answers was 
transformed into percentages and used as de-
pendent variable in a mixed-design ANOVA, 
with Condition (3: E, M, S) and Offer (3: N, D, 
U) as repeated factor, and gender (2: M, F) as 
between factor.  
Results showed a significant effect for Con-
dition (F (2,376) =101.75; p<0.001; η2p=0.35). 
Paired multiple comparisons revealed that 
judges were more inclined to accept offers 
within the M condition (M=77.76%; SD=2.26) 
than the E (p<0.0001; M=45.11%; SD=2.1) 
and the S (p<0.005; M=69.15%; SD=1.83) 
condition. In addition, the S condition trig-
gered a significantly higher accept rate than the 
E one (p<0.005; M=69.15%; SD=1.83).  
Also, the analysis revealed a significant Con-
dition *Offer effect (F4,752=42.05; p<0.0001; 
η2p=0.18). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that 
in the E task, N offers (M=80.5%; SD=2.43) 
were accepted more than U offers (M=36.03%; 
SD=3.38), which, in turn, were accepted more 
often than the D ones (M=18.79%; SD=2.73) 
(all p<0.0001). On the other hand, in the M 
task, the N offers (M=87.83%; SD=2.32) were 
accepted more often than both (p<0.0001) un-
fair offers (MD=72.09%; SD=3.22; MU=73.36%; 
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SD=3.29), which did not differ each other. Fi-
nally, in the S task, N (M=74.47%; SD=2.53) 
and U (M=72.03%; SD=2.72) offers were both 
accepted significantly more often than the D 
ones (M=60.96%; SD=2.42).  
Interestingly, responses in the different 
conditions were also modulated by Gender, as 
revealed by the significant Condition *Gender 
interaction (F(2,376)=7.12; p<0.005; η2p=0.04). 
Post-hoc comparisons revealed that men were 
more inclined to accept E offers (M=53.67%; 
SD=3.47) than women (p<0.001; M=36.54%; 
SD=2.33). Similarly, they were more inclined to 
accept S offers (M=53.67%; SD=3.47) than 
women (p=0.05; M=72.66%; SD=3.04). No 
significant differences emerged for the M situa-
tion. 
Fig. 1: Acceptance rates in men and women 
as revealed by the Condition * Gender effect. 
 
Moreover, the analysis revealed a significant 
effect for Offer (F(2,376)=116.08; p<0.001; 
η2p=0.38). Paired multiple comparisons re-
vealed that fair offers were more often accepted 
(M=80.93%; SD=1.71) than U offers (p<0.001; 
M=60.47%; SD=2.2) which, in turn, were more 
often accepted than D offers (p<0.001; 
M=50.61%; SD=1.87). Such an effect was also 
modulated by Gender, as revealed by the signif-
icant Offer*Gender interaction (F(2,376) = 
7.12; p<0.005; η2p=0.04). Post-hoc compari-
sons revealed that men were more inclined to 
accept U offers (M=68.02%; SD=3.66) than 
women (p<0.005; M=52.93%; SD=2.46). 
Moreover, men accepted significantly 
(p<0.0001) more often U (M=68.02%; 
SD=3.66) than D (M=52.32%; SD=3.11) of-
fers, while the effect was not significant for 
women (MU=52.93%; SD=2.46; MD=48.91%; 
SD=2.09. 
Fig. 2: Acceptance rates in men and women 
as revealed by the Offer * Gender Effect 
 
█  Correlations 
 
Pearson’s correlation analysis was applied 
to every dependent variable, including the 
acceptance percentage in every condition, 
with regard to BRET scorings. With regard 
to the E task, results showed a positive corre-
lation between BRET scorings and the num-
ber of accepted D offers (r=0.24; p<0.01) for 
women, and a negative one between BRET 
and the amount of accepted U offers (r=-
0.33; p<0.05) for men. For what concerns the 
M task, instead, results showed a positive re-
lation between BRET scorings and the num-
ber of accepted N offers (r=0.19; p<0.01) for 
women, and a negative correlation between 
BRET and the number of accepted N offers 
(r=-0.29; p<0.05) for men. 
 
█  Discussion and conclusion 
 
The present study aimed at investigating 
the decision-making behaviors of men and 
women during three different scenarios of 
the Ultimatum Game, including or not in-
cluding a moral component, as well as fair 
and unfair offers. In so doing we wanted to 
test if gender differences might modulate 
moral and economic decision-making, within 
the frame of utilitarianism. In fact, it de-
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scribes very well how the evaluation of costs 
and benefits may similarly determine human 
decisions in a variety of domains.72 It is well 
known that utilitarian and non-utilitarian 
decisions may be linked to the recruitment of 
two different thinking systems,73 one slow 
and reflective (system 2) and the other fast 
and intuitive (system 1). In this sense, utili-
tarian decisions should involve system 2, thus 
leading to more reflective and less intuitive 
decisions in evaluating both economic and 
moral dilemmas. 
However, this rational system does not re-
ly simply on pure data and well-designed al-
gorithms, but it is still influenced by a num-
ber of biological, subjective, contextual and 
cultural factors so that we can state each de-
cision is the consequence of a balanced cog-
nitive functioning.74 
Indeed, if we may suggest that utilitarian 
decisions need reflection, in prosocial con-
texts humans often show to be intuitively al-
truistic, even if altruism is generally associat-
ed with system 2 instead of system 1. 
This may be due to the fact that altruism 
is often advantageous in the social context 
and so we become altruistic thanks to a learn-
ing process that may involve an intuitive 
mechanism that Rand and colleagues called 
Social Heuristics.75 This learning process 
could perhaps explain gender-related differ-
ences, since women are often described to be 
more altruistic in real-life conditions, proba-
bly because of a higher social heuristics sen-
sibility.76 Thus, it is important to deepen our 
knowledge about the factors that may modu-
late human decisions. According to the 
abovementioned assumptions, we designed 
the present study to analyze how biological 
and cultural gender-related differences may 
affect the evaluation of some simple decision 
scenarios.  
A first significant result highlighted the 
presence of higher acceptance rates for the 
moral scenario. This was an expected result 
since we wanted our three conditions to be 
differently considered by responders based 
on their content. We believe that the moral 
scenario affected subjects’ responses, pushing 
for offers acceptance independent of any 
other contextual factors.77 In this context, in 
fact, our aim was to push participants to 
think about ethical obligations to others in-
stead of more general considerations about 
perceived fairness or unfairness of offers.  
We found this effect to be significant both 
for men and for women since all participants 
showed a similar response pattern. 
In particular, the moral scenario led to a 
higher number of acceptances respectively 
for neutral (N), advantaging (U) and disad-
vantaging (D) offers. 
Moreover, as a second result, an interaction 
effect between condition and offer emerged, 
showing that in the economic scenario, fair (N) 
offers were accepted more than advantaging 
(U) offers which, in turn, were accepted more 
often than disadvantaging (D) offers. In the 
moral scenario, instead, fair offers were accept-
ed more often than unfair offers (both ad-
vantaging and disadvantaging that did not dif-
fer from each other). Finally, in the shopping 
task, fair and advantaging offers were both ac-
cepted significantly more often than the disad-
vantaging offers. 
A third significant result revealed how the 
evaluation of the decision scenario may be 
modulated by gender-related differences: in 
fact, although the moral scenario led to the 
same acceptance rate in both genders, eco-
nomic and shopping offers were more likely 
to be accepted by men than women. Follow-
ing the Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH)78 
one would expect to find gender-related dif-
ferences, especially in moral dilemmas. How-
ever, we argue that the SHH is particularly 
useful to find out differences in a situation 
much similar to everyday life, while we used a 
quite artificial setting probably not so effi-
cient in triggering the Social Heuristics and 
the related prosocial behavior. 
Instead, we could suggest that the differ-
ences found between men and women in 
economic scenarios might be linked to a dif-
ferent level of data processing. In particular, 
it seems that men were more inclined to pur-
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sue a sort of optimal (effective) altruism 
when evaluating economic tasks.79 Different-
ly from the intuitive altruism described by 
the SSH, optimal altruism is a prosocial be-
havior that considers the proper means that 
may be applied in a given context, so consid-
ering the obligation to others needs in a ra-
tional way. In this sense, optimal altruism 
implies a utilitarian reasoning and the activa-
tion of thinking system 2. This way, in our 
experiment, male participants obtained on 
average a higher gain. 
We might argue that men considered the 
economic scenarios in a more reflective way, 
while women often relied their decisions on 
intuitive evaluation, thus being vulnerable to 
the negative emotions elicited by unfair of-
fers. This is coherent with a vision of women 
as being more affected by prosocial consider-
ations in everyday life situations. However, 
we can also offer other interpretations. First 
of all, since we used an ultimatum game par-
adigm, the differences we found might be 
due to a different consideration of risk. Since 
women are generally reported to be more risk 
aversive than men,80 we might think that 
women interpreted unfair offers as potential 
risks to avoid. Of course, we might also hy-
pothesize that female participants were less 
cognitively involved in economic tasks and 
that this fact prevents them to reflect proper-
ly on the decision to take. Actually, some 
studies reported women to be more affected 
by the specific characteristics of the experi-
mental condition or task.81  
At this regard, though we did not find any 
significant difference between men and 
women in risk propensity as measured by 
BRET, our correlational analyses revealed 
that in the economic task a higher risk-taking 
propensity was associated with a higher ac-
ceptance rate of disadvantaging offers in 
women, and a lower acceptance rate of ad-
vantaging offers in men. On the other hand, 
with regard to the moral scenario, a higher 
risk-taking propensity was associated with a 
higher acceptance rate of fair offers in wom-
en, and lower acceptance rate for men.   
Finally, another significant finding emerged 
about the type of offer. According to our expec-
tations, in fact, fair (N) offers were more likely 
to be accepted. These offers, in fact, are those 
that maximize utility, since both parts can ac-
cess half of the disputed goods. However, this 
effect was differently modulated in men and 
women. In fact, men were more inclined to ac-
cept advantages (U) offers than women. They 
also accepted more often advantaging (U) than 
disadvantaging (D) offers. Women, on the oth-
er side, equally accepted U and D offers, mean-
ing that in the case of an unfair offer, they ac-
cepted or refused them in a similar way, wheth-
er gaining or losing more money than the al-
leged opponent. 
This fact may be considered as the result 
of a cognitive process aimed at maximizing 
the final monetary outcome for both parts 
(i.e. it would be a utilitarian behavior), even 
if it implies the acceptance of a social ine-
quality. It’s also important to underline that 
men tried to avoid perceived losses. Instead, 
women did not show this asymmetric pat-
tern. These results may be modulated by the 
risk-taking propensity. Coherently with our 
data, Andreoni and Vesterlund82 described a 
quantitative curve for altruism, since it seems 
modulated by a sort of price effect. Intuitive-
ly, it means that it is easier to be altruistic 
when it is cheap, while when altruism implies 
a higher price the altruistic decision becomes 
cognitively heavier. However, women and 
men seem to be differently affected by the 
price, with men being more altruistic when it 
is cheap, while women are more inclined to 
be generous when higher prices are implied. 
Our tasks, then, seems to be more congenial 
for male altruism.  
To conclude, our data suggest the pres-
ence of gender differences in decision-
making. Of course, our study presents some 
limitations that must be considered before 
attempting generalization. 
First of all, the tasks we used are quite ar-
tificial and probably the cognitive processing 
is quite different than real-life situations. 
Second, it is well-known how gender differ-
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ences in decision-making are often influ-
enced by the specific features of the experi-
mental conditions. So, it is possible that the 
same paradigm may lead to slightly different 
results changing the experimental set-up. 
However, these problems are quite common 
in psychological studies on moral decision-
making. In addition, the sample presents 
some peculiarities, since women’s group is 
bigger than men’s one. Thus, future research 
should better consider this point for a more 
precise comparison. 
Moreover, it is composed by young uni-
versity students, while we might think that 
the age-related social learning might impact 
on moral as well as economics evaluations. 
Accordingly, age-related effects could be bet-
ter explored in future contributions. Anyway, 
our results are strong enough to deserve at-
tention both to suggest practical considera-
tions and to stimulate future research. In par-
ticular, we argue that the presented data sug-
gest that considering utilitarian decisions as 
the results of a reflective process is a simplis-
tic vision. Utilitarian and non-utilitarian be-
haviors both involve the use of system 1 and 
system 2, so that the different factors related 
to the decision context may produce a specif-
ic balance. In particular, the role of gender in 
modulating the achievement of this balance 
seems quite strong. Men seem to be more ra-
tional in pursuing altruism while women are 
more intuitive and more oriented to human 
needs than economic considerations. 
However, it is not clear if these effects are 
due to cultural-related biases, that push 
women and men to put attention on different 
aspects of life and to adopt different cogni-
tive styles, or to biological differences. How-
ever, this question is rather misleading. In 
fact, it is quite difficult to distinguish be-
tween the effects of the cultural domain on 
the cognitive performance and, more gener-
ally, the complex interaction between cultur-
al and biological factors, which cannot be ex-
cluded in the interpretation of gender-related 
differences.83 Thus, though we argue that 
utilitarian and altruistic attitudes are differ-
ently modulated by task demands in men and 
women, we cannot state that these differ-
ences are more related to biological charac-
teristics or to cultural biases.  
However, we can argue that education 
and school programs might consider putting 
attention on the gender-related differences 
highlighted in this as well as other studies, 
both to reduce gender inequities and to ex-
ploit gender differences to empower deci-
sion-making skills in different domains.  
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